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MAURICE FINKELSTEINt
N business, as in government, experts are ever on tap, with sug-
gestions for the taxpayer upon which no Mephistopheles could im-
prove. They offer to erect an impregnable fortress into which the tax
collector cannot penetrate. Eager to escape thither, the taxpayer, who
has been told on high authority that it is not even a patriotic duty to
pay more than the legal minimum,' faithfully follows the paths indicated
by his counsellors. The bricks and mortar of these fortresses consist of
corporate entities, inter-company accounts, stock dividends and the like.
But it often turns out that the resulting tax is paid without even the
comfort of a patriotic duty well done.
In administering the Income Tax Law the treasury has refused the
burden of advising taxpayers in advance of the adoption of a plan
whether it will result in an increased or diminished tax.2 Frequently
the determination depends upon whether the law will respect the separate
corporate personalities brought into being by the taxpayer, or as the
judges say, will look "through form to substance" and disregard the
existence of the corporate entity. Here is a field of law in which, as in
so many others, predictability is highly desirable. Yet here too, judicial
statesmanship plays the important role, to the confusion of the experts
and the occasional unwilling patriotism of the taxpayer.
It has been pointed out that Congress itself frequently found it neces-
sary, in enacting income tax legislation, to make special provisions dis-
regarding the corporate entity.3 These appear in regulations applicable
to personal service corporations,4 in requirements for consolidated re-
turns from affiliated corporations, and the penalties imposed upon cor-
porations which accumulate unnecessary surplus to avoid surtaxes on
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the income of stockholders.' The problem we are here considering, how-
ever, does not involve the power of Congress to collect taxes in disregard
of corporate entity, but is rather the problem of determining the intent
of Congress with regard to corporate entities concerning which it has not
spoken at all.
I
Judicial attempts to formulate principles to guide the treasury in
collecting and the taxpayer in deciding whether to contest taxes of
this sort have not been wanting. But as in the case of all standards of
judgment, it is one thing to state a proposition and another to apply it to
numerous and varying factual situations. First year law students are
all familiar with the hardships encountered in isolating the reasonable
man. Constitutional lawyers have long ago abandoned the effort to
define "due process of law". These things we all know about. But
lawyers are too prone to overlook the fact that, even in so theoretically
routine a matter as collecting the income tax, "imponderables have
weight".
The courts have freely recognized the difficulties involved in estab-
lishing a working rule to determine in what classes of cases the corporate
entity will be disregarded in assessing the income tax. Judge Learned
Hand, discussing this problem, tells us:
"If our law regarded a corporation as an association of individuals created
for the purposes defined in their charter, whose extent was measured as we
measure that of a consensual association, like a partnership, an unincorporated
society, or a criminal conspiracy, the result would be simple. Such a corpor-
ation would be immanent in everything which was done in execution of its
purposes. Or if we had the hardihood to adhere to the rigid convention of a
corporation persona, in which, however empty a shell, all rights reside, and
to which all duties attach, whatever the strain on our moral predilections, at
least we should have a workable concept. As it is, our lav has been baffled by
the problem and has wavered between the two alternatives. Since we have
no statutes of uses to execute the dry use, I have no great confidence that I
can pick a certain path among the cases." 7
Mr. Justice Holmes with customary sententious expression has offered
a guide, which while it may not solve specific problems that arise, yet has
the merit of presenting the issue in a form calculated to simplify analytic
examination. He says:
"We do not speak of evasion, because, when the law draws a line, a case is
on one side of it or the other, and if on the safe side is none the worse legally
that a party has availed himself to the full of what the law permits. When an
6. Revenue Act of 1934, Sec. 102, P. L. No. 216, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1934).
7. Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Newton, 289 Fed. 1013, 1015 (S. D. N. Y. 1923).
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act is condemned as an evasion what is meant is that it is on the wrong side of
the line indicated by the policy if not by the mere letter of the law."
To ascertain the locus of the line we must in many cases determine
whether a particular corporation shall be regarded as a separate person-
ality whose income can be taxed only to it and entirely to it or whether
in the given case we shall disregard the fiction of the corporate person-
ality in order to attach the corporation's income to other persons or
allow them to deduct from their own income the corporate losses. The
courts never weary of telling us that they "recognize the importance of
regarding matters of substance and disregarding forms in applying the
provisions of the Sixteenth Amendment and the Income Tax Laws enacted
thereunder".' But the corporate personality cannot be brushed aside
as a mere form in all .cases.
Mr. Justice McReynolds tells us that it is only "unusual cases"' 0 that
may require the disregard of the corporate form; and the Board of Tax
Appeals, very early in its history, said that the "corporate entity will not
be disregarded except in extraordinary circumstances."" Judge Learn-
ed Hand, although fully aware of the difficulties involved, has likewise
offered a working principle for the determination of problems involving
the corporate entity:
"A corporation, stripped of its fictitious personality, is an association of
persons mutually agreed upon the execution of more or less definitely ex-
pressed purposes, publicly registered as the law requires. In the case of
industrial corporations, the personnel of the membership is an immaterial
matter; the original members leave as they please and their substitutes'enter
merely by purchase. Even the number of the members changes from time
to time. If so, it is the common purposes and their execution alone that de-
termine the corporation, and whatever substantially changes these changes
the corporation itself, and the rights of its stockholders."' 2
These expressions of principle can hardly be regarded as rules of
thumb. No one of them by itself can offer any great help in the solution
of specific problems. Perhaps a combination of all of these principles
has a greater individual applicability, but in the main they must be
regarded as justifications judicially worked out for results in particular
cases.
Because in equity it frequently happens that courts will avoid in-
justice to litigants by lifting the corporate veil, it is commonly imagined
8. Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U. S. 625, 630 (1916).
9. United States v. Phellis, 257 U. S. 156, 168 (1921).
10. Burnet v. Commonwealth Improvement Co., 287 U. S. 415, 419 (1932).
11. Regal Shoe Co., 1 B. T. A. 896, 899 (1925).
12. United States v. Rockefeller, 274 Fed. 952, 955 (S. D. N. Y. 1921), aff'd 257
U. S. 176 (1921).
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that the disregard of the corporate entity produces the larger tax col-
lection. This is by no means always the fact. Frequently the greatest
tax can be collected only by rigid adherence to the separate personality
of corporations; and, as we shall have occasion to point out, some
judges who are apparently guided by the principle that maximum tax-
ation is the greatest good have oscillated between one position and
another as the cause of the tax collector required.
The multitude of forms in which this problem makes its appearance
on the judicial scene is limited only by the scope of the imaginative
powers of the tax experts. The courts are constantly being confronted
with apparently distinguishable situations and instances which are not
quite like those that have gone before. In the end, the judges are
avowedly baffled and find themselves with a rule always in parturition,
never delivered.
Reorganization cases are in point. A reorganization occurs when
stockholders receive securities of their own corporation or of a new cor-
poration, in exchange for or in addition to their old securities.3 The
simplest form is the declaration of a stock dividend consisting of un-
issued stock of the dividend paying corporation. A stock dividend
may also consist, however, of securities of another corporation which
are owned by the dividend paying corporation. A reorganization may
take place by the transfer of the assets of one corporation to another, and
the distribution of the securities of the new corporation to the stock-
holders of the old either directly or by way of stock dividend. In all
of these cases, the income tax problem is concerned with the determin-
ation of whether or not the securities received by the stockholder are
taxable as income to him. In all of them, except in the case of the
simple stock dividend, insistence upon the separate entity of the cor-
porations involved makes the distribution of securities taxable income.
In the stock dividend case, the Supreme Court exempted the securities
from taxation both on constitutional and analytic grounds. In the
other cases, the Supreme Court has not been consistent. On one oc-
casion, in Weiss v. Steam, 4 it held that where the assets of a corporation
are transferred to a new corporation, and the stock of the new corpora-
tion is distributed to the stockholders of the old, no income taxable to
the stockholder results. Here the court pointed out the essential identity
between the new and the old corporation. In Marr v. United States,"
13. We are not here using the term "reorganization' in the technical sense in which
it is defined in Section 112 (g) of the Revenue Act of 1934, P. L. No. 216, 73d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1934), but rather, loosely, to describe a change in corporate structure.
14. 265 U. S. 242 (1924).
15. 268 U. S. 536 (1925).
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however, and in Cullinan v. Walker,6 the contrary result was reached.
It has been said that Weiss v. Steam was wrongly decided, but it has
been cited by the Supreme Court and often followed by lower courts.1"
The truth is that the Supreme Court has set up two conflicting lines of
decision resulting from its inability to arrive at a working rule with
regard to the problem of the corporate entity."8
The same conflict is apparent in the lower courts, where the problem
has produced conflicting decisions in the various circuits. Thus Judge
Parker, writing for the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
in Western Maryland Railway Company v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue,19 held that a corporation taking over the assets of an old cor-
poration may continue to deduct amortization of bonds sold at a discount
by the former corporation on the theory of the identity of the two
corporations. A different court in a different circuit held precisely the
reverse in Turner-Farber-Love Company v. Helvering.20 And still another
circuit, in United States v. Alpha Portland Cement Company,2' deter-
mined that the transfer of property of one corporation to another and
the distribution of the stock of the new corporation to the stockholders
of the old resulted in no income taxable to the old stockholders.
Brief writers would have no difficulty in building up a case for or
against the taxation of such securities as income by the simple device of
distinguishing all details of fact in opposing cases or by the more
academic practice of denouncing contrary decisions as wrongly decided.
The disregard of the corporate entity in income tax cases involving
the relations between parent and subsidiary corporations is generally
supposed to be supported by two decisions of the Supreme Court rendered
in 1918: Southern Pacific Company v. Lowe2 2 and Gulf Oil Corpora-
tion v. Lewellyn 3 In both cases the Court held that a dividend
paid by a wholly owned subsidiary to the parent corporation out of earn-
16. 262 U. S. 134 (1923).
17. Bowers v. Lawyers Mortgage Co., 285 U. S. 182, 188 (1932); A-C Investment
Ass'n v. Helvering, 68 F. (2d) 386, 390 (App. D. C. 1933); Burnet v. Kountze, 66 F.
(2d) 141, 144 (C. C. A. 8th, 1933); Shreveport-El Dorado Pipe Line Co. v. McGrawl,
63 F. (2d) 202, 204 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933).
18. But cf. Note (1932) 80 U. or PA. L. REv. 892, 898, and also Beale, Stockholders
and the Federal Income Tax (1923) 37 HARv. L. REv. 1.
19. 33 F. (2d) 695, 698 (C. C. A. 4th, 1929): "It is instructive to note the many
tax cases decided in recent years in which the courts have not hesitated to ignore cor-
porate forms, and to decide the questions involved in the light of what the parties have
actually done, rather than on the basis of the forms in which they have clothed their
transactions."
20. 68 F. (2d) 416 (App. D. C. 1933).
21. 261 Fed. 339 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1919).
22. 247 U. S. 330 (1918).
23. 248 U. S. 71 (1918).
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ings accrued before March, 1913, was not income of the parent corpor-
ation. The holding was not based on the proposition that the earnings
accrued before March, 1913, the date when the Income Tax Law became
effective, since the Supreme Court has also held that dividends paid in
the regular course of business out of earnings accrued before that date
are taxable to the stockholder. -  The decisions were rather based
upon the proposition that the parent and the subsidiary were not separate
entities.25 Lower courts have followed these decisions more faithfully
than has the Supreme Court itself.20  The Court, however, has apparently
been aware of the fact that these cases establish no rule of general
application, first, because they are by their express terms limited to the
facts before it,27 and secondly, because in spite of the decision taxing
dividends paid out of earnings accrued before March, 1913, there seems
to have been some hesitancy on the part of the Court to apply this rule
to these cases. Moreover, the Supreme Court has departed from the
notion that a wholly owned subsidiary is not a separate entity. This
fact appears most strongly in the recent case of Burnet v. Common-
wealth Improvement Company,'0 where the exchange of securities be-
tween a corporation and its sole stockholder was held to constitute a
taxable transaction and where the court expressly distinguished and
limited Southern Pacific Company v. Lowe.-
Another situation in which the recognition or disregard of the corporate
entity presents a problem is found when one corporation leases property
to another, -with the rent payable directly to the stockholders of the
lessor. While the courts do not have any difficulty in disregarding the
corporate entity in this class of cases and have held that the sums paid to
the stockholders may be regarded as income to the corporation and taxed
to the corporation, they have nevertheless in practice permitted the
avoidance of the tax by the holding that the stockholder who receives
the rent is not answerable at all for the default of the corporation lessor
in paying the tax even where all the assets of the corporation have been
distributed to the stockholders.2s By this process the tax is effectively
24. Lynch v. Hornby, 247 U. S. 339 (1918).
25. "While the two companies were separate legal entities, yet in fact, and for all
practical purposes they were merged, the former being but a part of the latter, acting
merely as its agent and subject in all things to its proper direction and control. Southern
Pacific Co. v. Lowe, 247 U. S. 330, 337 (1918).
26. Kirby Lumber Co. v. United States, 44 F. (2d) 85 (Ct. Cl. 1930); Labrot v.
Burnet, 57 F. (2d) 413 (App. D. C. 1932); H. H. Miller Industries Co. v. Commno- oner
of Internal Revenue, 61 F. (2d) 412 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932); Thorsen v. Commrizzioner of
Internal Revenue, 65 F. (2d) 234 (C. C. A. 9th, 1933).
27. "The case turns upon its very peculiar facts, and is distinguishable from others in
which the question of the identity of a controlling stockholder with his corporation has
been raised.' Southern Pacific Co. v. Lowe, 247 U. S. 330, 338 (1918).
28. Cf. Anderson v. Morris & Essex Rr. Co., 216 Fed. 83 (C. C. A. 2d, 1914), where
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circumvented, for the corporation lessor having leased the property and
provided for the payment of rent to the stockholders now distributes its
assets among the stockholders, and while theoretically the court dis-
regards the corporate entity and holds that the Commissioner is justified
in assessing the tax against the lessor corporation, practically, the hold-
ing that he cannot follow the assets for the purpose of collection into the
hands of the stockholders is equivalent to a determination that the
stockholder and the corporation are in reality distinct juristic persons.
And no attempt is made by the courts to explain these apparently
incompatible holdings.
The recent effort of the Board of Tax Appeals in George H. Cdsholm"
to formulate a rule by which to determine whether a particular trans-
action is with a real juristic person or a phantom entity is all the more
welcome in view of the failure of the courts to provide an even partially
satisfactory guiding principle. The Board tells us that if a corporation
is formed in the ordinary course of the taxpayer's business and for the
purpose of serving the proper ends of its commercial activity, then the
corporate entity should be respected; but that if the corporation is formed
when the shadow of the tax hovers over the taxpayer and in a last
minute attempt to avoid its blow, then the law will ignore the legal
fiction of the corporation person. It is obvious that this looks in the
direction of the motive of the taxpayer, so that if a corporation is organ-
ized for the express purpose of avoiding a tax liability, and cannot be
justified as a normal business act, the corporate entity will be disregarded.
But even this rule, which commends itself to reason, has not been adopted
by the courts. The notion persists in many decisions that a pattern of
the court, construing the excise tax of August 5, 1909, said at page 90: "The notion
that a corporation is an artificial entity distinct from the members who compose It Is a
fiction of the law which the courts recognize for some purposes and disregard for others.
Without going into the matter at length, it suffices to say that the fact that the leIsee
paid the rent, not to the corporate entity, but to the stockholders and bondholders, can-
not prevent the act from applying to the money so paid if the other conditions of the
act make its terms applicable. The fiction referred to cannot be permitted to accomplish
a fraud upon the statute and an evasion of its obligations." Yet in this very case the
corporation escaped the tax because it was no longer "doing business" within the meaning
of the statute. In Rensselaer and Saratoga Rr. v. Irwin, 249 Fed. 726 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918),
the court held that rent paid by the lessee to the stockholders of the lessor was corporate
income of the lessor and could be taxed as such, but said at page 728: "We are not
concerned with the questions how the plaintiff can pay the tax or how the Government
is going to collect it." See also American Telegraph and Cable Co. v. United States, 61
Ct. Cl. 326 (1925), cert. denied 271 U. S. 660 (1926). And in Harwood v. Eaton, 68
F. (2d) 12 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933), it was specifically held that the owner of stock In a
corporation is not liable as transferee for income taxes due from his corporation on
account of rent paid directly to such stockholder pursuant to the lease. To the same effect
see United States v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 50 F. (2d) 102 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931).
29. 29 B. T. A. 1334 (1934).
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conduct mapped out by a taxpayer must be judged without regard to
the motive which led to its adoption3 °
Nevertheless, many courts, and the Board of Tax Appeals itself in
earlier cases, seem to have been groping their way inarticulately toward
some such rule. The corporate entity has been disregarded and addition-
al income taxes imposed in a long line of cases, which, although they
do not fall into any scientific classification, seem to have as a common
denominator a certain transparency which reveals the taxpayers' un-
willingness to be taxed, even where the motive is not definitely to evade
taxation. The taxpayer in such cases usually produces reasons for his
conduct which are quite independent of the tax law, but these reasons are
in the main quite thin, and though they may perhaps explain, from the
point of view of the courts they do not justify the avoidance of the tax
liability.
The cases need but be collected to illustrate the point. Thus it
was held that a corporate entity will be disregarded where the corporation
was created merely for the purpose of passing title and receiving pay-
ment; 1 that a transfer of property by a corporation to two of its stock-
holders in order for them, rather than the corporation, to fulfill a contract
to sell property does not avoid the tax to be paid by the corporation; 32
that a sale by a corporation to its president, who on the same day resold
the property and divided the profits amongst its stockholders, does not
relieve the corporation from the necessity of paying the tax on the
profit; 3 that a corporation may not deduct a loss which it has suffered
by the sale of securities to its stockholders for less than cost;"' that the
corporate entities will be disregarded where a liquidating corporation
transfers its property to another corporation for the benefit of its stock-
holders.n In these and other cases, the courts using the most general
30. "We agree with the Board and the taxpayer that a transaction, otherwis e within
an exception of the tax law, does not lose its immunity, because it is actuated by a
desire to avoid, or, if one choose, to evade, taxation. Any one may so arrange his affairs
that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose that pattern vich
will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to increasse one's taxes"
Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F. (2d) 809, 810 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934). In the same case the
Board of Tax Appeals below said: "As long as corporations are recognized before the
law as if they were creatures of substance, there is nothing to distinguish this corporation
from innumerable others, whether they be devised to achieve a temporary tax reduction
or some other legitimate end." E. F. Gregory, 27 B. T. A. 223, 225 (1932). Cf. also
quotation from Bullen v. Wisconsin, supra note 8.
31. J. L. McInerney, 29 B. T. A. 1 (1933).
32. Nace Realty Co., 28 B. T. A. 467 (1933).
33. S. A. Aacqueen Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 67 F. (2d) 857 (C. r- A.
3rd, 1933).
34. Al. I. Stewart & Co., 2 B. T. A. 737 (1925).
35. W. P. Fox & Sons, Inc., 15 B. T. A. 115 (1929).
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language and relying upon the decisions to which we have animadverted
above have ignored the separate personality of corporations and have
levied taxes accordingly.3 6
But an equally imposing array of cases might be collected where the
Board of Tax Appeals or the courts have refused, citing other cases, to
disregard the corporate personality. Again, the mere enumeration of the
situation reveals the conflict between the cases and the difficulties en-
countered in stating any guiding principle. For example, it has been
held that where a corporation transfers its assets to a partnership com-
posed of its stockholders, a taxable transaction results;" that the liquid-
ation of a corporation which has only one stockholder may result in a gain
to the stockholders;37 that a corporation formed simply for convenience,
without any profit motive whatsoever, is nevertheless an entity separate
from its stockholders; 8 that the salary paid to a sole stockholder is a
deductible item. 9 And there are many similar cases.40
36. See, for example, Coudon v. Tait, 56 F. (2d) 208, 211 (D. C. Md. 1932), where the
court said: "As the Delaware corporation is a mere holding company and a convenient
conduit for the transfer of dividends from the operating and earning companies to the
ultimate owners (the stockholders of the Delaware corporation), it would be legally possi-
ble, if necessary, to disregard the corporate fiction of the holding company in order
that the obvious purpose of Congress to tax income from dividends in the ordinary form
should be accomplished." See also Labrot v. Burnet, 57 F. (2d) 413 (App. D. C. 1932)
(holding that the transfer of a farm by a partnership to a corporation of which the
partners were the sole stockholders cannot result in a deductible loss); Industrial Cotton
Mills v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 61 F. (2d) 291 (C. C. A. 4th, 1932) (holding
that a loss sustained by a subsidiary before merger with the parent corporation is deductible
by the merged corporation) ; H. H. Miller Industries v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
61 F. (2d) 412 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932) (holding that upon transfers of assets by one cor-
poration to another identically owned and controlled, depreciation may be deducted
from cost to first corporation); Michaels v. McLaughlin, 20 F. (2d) 959 (N. D. Cal. 1927)
(holding that a bookkeeping transfer from profit and loss to capital in discharge of stock-
holder's obligation to corporation is not taxable income).
37. John K. Greenwood, 1 B. T. A. 291 (1925).
38. Waldron Co., 2 B. T. A. 715 (1925).
39. Max Levy & Co., 3 B. T. A. 422 (1926); International Building Co., 21 B. T. A.
617 (1930).
40. In Fruit Belt Telephone Co., 22 B. T. A. 440 (1931), the Board held that a sale
by a corporation of all of its assets to its two sole stockholders and a resale on the same
day by the stockholders to another corporation at a higher price was not in bad faith and
did not give rise to the necessity of ignoring the corporate entity. We quote from p. 441:
"A corporation may clearly do what it has a legal right to do, even for the sole purpose
of reducing its tax liability. It is not required to pursue a course which gives rise to a
greater tax liability if another course is open to it which gives rise to a less tax liability."
See also Nixon v. Lucas, 42 F. (2d) 833 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930) (holding that partners
who own all the stock of a corporation may not deduct losses incurred by the corporation
of money loaned by the partners); Walker v. Gulf & Interstate Ry. Co. of Texas, 269
Fed. 885 (C. C. A. 5th, 1921) (holding that money advanced by a corporation to pay
the operating loss of a subsidiary is not deductible); New York, Chicago & St. Louis Rr.
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At this point it will no doubt be surmised by the legal technician that
a close inspection of the cases might reveal bases for distinction between
decisions that respect corporate entities and those that disregard them.
And in truth this field of law is no exception to the general rule that
the courts proceed by the method of exclusion and inclusion. Un-
fortunately the grounds for excluding a case from a stated rule or in-
cluding it therein do not here lend themselves to scientific analysis.
For example, when the Supreme Court decided the case of Weiss v.
Steam, 4 it had before it the decisions in United States v. Phellis,0 Rocke-
feller v. United States4" and Cullinan v. Walker," all of which were
decided on a different theory from that pronounced in the case at bar.
Only one paragraph is devoted to distinguishing the earlier decisions,
and it reads as follows:
"As the result of transactions disclosed in the Phellis and Rockefeller Cases,
certain corporate assets not exceeding accumulated surplus were segregated and
passed to individual stockholders. The value of the segregated thing so received
was held to constitute taxable income. Cullinan's gain resulted from a divi-
dend in liquidation actually distributed in the stock of a holding company
incorporated under the laws of a foreign state, not organized for the purpose
of carrying on the old business, and which held no title to the original assets."-
When these distinctions are closely analyzed, they disappear. Appar-
ently the Court was of the opinion that upon the transfer of assets of
one corporation to another the distribution of the securities of the new
corporation to the stockholders of the old is taxable (a) if the assets
transferred do not exceed the value of the accumulated surplus of the
old corporation, and (b) where the new corporation is organized under
the laws of a foreign state; for, contrary to the assertion of the court, the
new corporations in the Cullinan case were in fact organized, not for the
purpose of liquidation, but for carrying on the business of the old. But
the distribution even of surplus in the form of stock to the stockholders
of a corporation had already been held in Eisner v. Macomberi4 not to
constitute income; and in these days, when the choice of a state for
incorporation is so largely a matter of convenience, it is difficult to see
Co. v. Burnet, 64 F. (2d) 152 (App. D. C. 1933) (holding that a corporation formed
to take over assets from a receiver of another by issuing its securities to the security hold-
ers of the old corporation is a separate entity from the old corporation); cf. Gramaphone
and Typewriter, Ltd. v. Stanley, [1906] 2 K. B. 856, aff'd by the Court of Appeals, [1903)
2 K. B. 89 (holding that ownership of all stock of a German corporation by an Englh-
corporation does not make the business of the former part of the latter's busine-s for pur-
poses of income tax).
41. 257 U. S. 176 (1921).
42. 265 U. S. 242, 252 (1924).
43. 252 U. S. 189 (1920).
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how a corporation organized under the laws of one state differs essen-
tially from one organized under the laws of any other state.
When we read in the subsequent opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis in
Marr v. United States,5 how he in turn distinguishes Weiss v. Steam,1
4
from which he had dissented, our view with regard to the triviality of
these distinctions is reinforced. He says: "In Weiss v. Stearn a new
corporation had, in fact, been organized to take over the assets and
business of the old". 44 This of course is true in all of these cases. "Tech-
nically there was a new entity;" 4 4 but of course technically there always
is a new entity. He continues:
"...but the corporate identity was deemed to have been substantially main-
tained because the new corporation was organized under the laws of the same
State, with presumably the same powers as the old. There was also no change
in the character of securities issued. By reason of these facts, the proportional
interest of the stockholder after the distribution of the new securities was deemed
to be exactly the same as if the par value of the stock in the old corporation had
been reduced, and five shares of reduced par value stock had been issued in
place of every two shares of the old stock. Thus, in Weiss v. Stearn, as in Eisner
v. Macomber the transaction was considered, in essence, an exchange of certifi-
cates representing the same interest, not an exchange of interests." 44
In other words, the essential difference which is relied on by the court
is that the two corporations in Weiss v. Stearn were formed under the
laws of the same state, whereas in the prior cases they were formed under
the laws of different states. That this distinction is without any sub-
stantial importance will, I think, be readily conceded. And yet, the court
is compelled to emphasize the distinction, saying,
"In the case at bar, the new corporation is essentially different from the old,
A corporation organized under the laws of Delaware does not have the same
rights and powers as one organized under the laws of New Jersey. Because of
these inherent differences in rights and powers, both the preferred and the
common stock of the old corporation is an essentially different thing from stock
of the same general kind in the new." (Italics ours).45
These "inherent differences" are apparently abandoned by the dis-
senting judges in the Marr case-the very same judges who created the
distinction in Weiss v. Steam. Here they maintain that that case "did
not turn upon the relatively unimportant circumstances that the new and
old corporations were organized under the laws of the same State. 14 01
Again, in Western Maryland Railway Company v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue,'9 where the court disregarded corporate entities, it
44. Marr v. United States, 268 U. S. 536, 541 (1925).
45. Ibid.
46. Id. at 542.
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was admitted that the new corporation "is a distinct legal entity from
those whose places it has taken";"z nevertheless the decision was support-
ed because of the identity of management, assets and stockholders of the
two corporations. Yet in Turner-Farber-Love Company v. Hdvering,'
where a contrary result was reached, a distinction was found by the court
in the fact that the transfer of assets was here brought about by a legal
transfer which left the old corporation still technically alive, whereas in
the Western Maryland case, said the court, there was a consolidation of
the two companies which destroyed the existence of the old corporation
as a separate entity. In view of the fact that where one corporation is
organized to take over the assets of another it is immaterial whether
the two corporations are technically merged or whether the first transfers
its assets to the second, this distinction would also seem to be without
any important basis. In both cases, the new corporation steps into the
shoes of the old by the same management, same stockholders and the
same liabilities as well as the same assets. Only the legal form by which
this is accomplished is different. Instead of choosing one legal device
they choose another. Can this be said, in all seriousness, to supply a
distinction upon which an important legal differentiation can be based?
In Nixon v. Lucas,48 a corporation which was admittedly organized
merely for convenience and used as a mere form, was regarded as a
separate entity. Here the court stated it as a general rule that corpora-
tions are usually regarded as separate entities and said that, "The ex-
ceptions are those in which the persons charged, ignoring the constituted
authorities of the corporation, transact the business themselves, though
in its name", and added that if "a legal transaction arises between a
company and those who control it, the relations ensuing are the same
as between any other persons, if so intended." 9 Yet the Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in S. A. Macqueen Company v. Com-
missioner of Internal'Revenuep disregarded corporate entity where con-
venience was the cause of the transaction with the simple assertion that
"the principle that substance and not form should control in the applica-
tion of income tax law may be invoked in the instant case"!.1
It is perhaps needless to multiply illustrations of the resourcefulness
of judicial craftsmanship. Distinguishing cases on the basis of adven-
titious facts does not lead to the establishment of rules or principles
which can aid the treasury or the taxpayer in determining a course of
conduct. It is clear beyond peradventure that no guiding principle can
be stated which will explain even most of the cases. On the contrary,
47. 33 F. (2d) 695, 697 (C. C. A. 4th, 1929).
43. 42 F. (2d) 833 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930).
49. Id. at 834.
50. 67 F. (2d) 357, 858 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1933).
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it might with confidence be stated that as far as a specific new problem
is concerned, the prediction of the judicial attitude is entirely beyond the
power of the legal mind.
II
When analysis fails, legal theorists frequently turn to psychology, but
here we are obviously in a field where conjecture rather than certainty is
the rule. For if we consider the decisions of the judges we find that
frequently the same judge has concurred in opinions which involved
diametrically opposite views with regard to the corporate entity. For
example, in Burnet v. Commonwealth Improvement Company,10 a com-
pafatively recent case, the entire court concurred in an opinion which
emphatically stressed the separate personality of a corporation and its
sole stockholder and proceeded to impose a tax on the basis thereof.
Yet Mr. Justice McReynolds and Mr. Justice Brandeis, who were mem-
bers of the Court and concurred in that decision, also concurred in the
opinion in Gulf Oil Company v. Lewellyn ' 3 which relieved the taxpayer
of a tax liability in a very similar situation by ignoring the separate
entity of a corporation. And in the last named case, Mr. Justice Clarke
concurred with the majority though he dissented from a similar decision
in an almost identical case previously decided: Southern Pacific Railway
Company v. Lowe.22 In Rockefeller v. United States 1 only Mr. Justice
McReynolds and Mr. Justice VanDevanter dissented from the opinion
which respected separate corporate entities, but in Cullinan v. Walker"0
they joined with the majority which followed the Rockefeller case. On
the other hand, in Weiss v. Stearn,4 where the majority disregarded the
corporate entity, only Justices Holmes and Brandeis dissented; and the
opinion of the majority was concurred in by Justices Taft,' McKenna,
VanDevanter, McReynolds, Sutherland, Butler and Sanford. In Marr
v. United States, 5 Weiss v. Stearn was not followed; yet Justices Taft
and McKenna were still joined with the majority, this time in insisting
upon a corporate entity. It would seem therefore, that after the decision
in Cullinan v. Walker,'6 only Justices McReynolds and VanDevanter
maintained consistently the position that corporate entities should be
disregarded in this lass of cases. But of course even these two Justices,
as we have seen, did not hold this view in Cullinan v. Walker;10 moreover,
they both joined the majority in the most recent case, Burnet v. Common-
wealth Improvement Company,0 where the Supreme Court unanimously
upheld the doctrine of the separate corporate entity in a case involving a
transaction between a corporation and its sole stockholder.
It is plain, therefore, that one would have to go beyond the four
corners of judicial opinions to discover a psychological explanation of the
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judicial line-up in these cases, a task which mere students of law are
probably not competent to undertake.
Occasionally a forceful judge with a penchant for logical statement will
reveal in his opinions the difficulties encountered in this situation.
Such a one is Judge Learned Hand. There are times when reading his
opinions would lead the unwary to conclude that he favors as a guiding
principle the desirability of collecting the federal income tax. For
example, he refused to follow the decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States in Southern Pacific Railway Company v. Lowe- that
dividends paid by a wholly owned subsidiary are not taxable as income
to the parent corporation, although he admitted that "ordinarily we
should assume that a decision of the Supreme Court, so similar upon
the facts, laid down a rule of general application, even though the court
itself declared that it turned 'upon its very peculiar facts' ".1 But in the
same case he insisted upon the separate entity of a corporation which had,
as he said, "only a formal existence, all its transactions being in fact de-
termined by the parent, which kept it alive for reasons of accounting and
the like; though the form was consistently observed, both in the books,
and by means of a dummy board of directors."'" He concurred in the
opinion in Harwood v. Eaton, 2 which held that a corporation is taxable
when it leases its property under a lease which provided for the payment
of the rent directly to the stockholders, but found it necessary to state
in a separate opinion that "a corporation is not distinct from its share-
holders in such a situation as this, 3 and to add, after discussing the un-
satisfactory state of the law on this point: "This being the setting, we
do no violence to language, if we say that the payments, though made
directly to each shareholder, were payments to the associates as a group;
and that they are identified with the corporation, so far as it must be
construed as having an independent personality, a vexed question at
best."54 He held that a tax resulted in a case where a corporation was
formed solely for the purpose of evading the tax,' but here found it
necessary to say with regard to the problem of the separate corporate
entity that he disagreed with the manner in which the Commissioner
below had disregarded it and that the corporation, though formed in order
to evade taxation, "had a juristic personality, whatever the purpose of its
organization."55 In United States v. Rockefeller,' " he insisted upon the
separate entity of corporations and collected a tax, escaping contrary
decisions by suggesting diversity of purpose between the two corporations
51. Nixon v. Lucas, 42 F. (2d) 833, 835 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930).
52. 68 F. (2d) 12 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933).
53. Id. at 14.
54. Id. at 15.
55. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F. (2d) 809, 811 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934).
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as a basis for separate corporate personalities, and disregarding common
stockholding and control. We find that he even dissented from his
brethren in the Circuit Court when they held with the taxpayer in an
income tax case and supported his dissent by an apparent confusion
between an option and a privilege though he admitted that the case was
a "hard one"."
If from these illustrations we conclude that Judge Learned Hand
proposed to collect the income tax and to disregard or insist upon the
corporate entity whichever may be necessary for the purpose, we are
perhaps, to paraphrase his own opinion, not doing violence to the proc-
ess of legal induction. That he has not had the same attitude with
regard to other kinds of taxes appears not only from Proctor & Gamble
Company v. Newton,7 in which he allowed a corporation to escape a
state tax though it was controlled by a parent corporation, on the un-
substantial ground that its officers were chosen by its own board, though
the board was controlled by the parent corporation, but also from an
older case dealing with the old federal excise tax, United States v.
Oregon-Washington Railroad & Navigation Company, 7 where he held
that forgiveness of a debt by a sole stockholder of a corporation to the
corporation did not constitute income within the meaning of that tax
law.
III
The difficulty of finding a consistent and satisfactory rule in the
cases, leaves us with the problem of suggesting an approach which will
produce the necessary predictability so essential to fairness in taxation
and at the same time avoid the sacrifice of governmental revenue to be
derived from the income tax. Some limited assistance to the attain-
ment of these ends, it is true, might be secured through purely adminis-
trative measures. Thus the treasury might adopt the policy of advising
taxpayers in advance of the formulation of a plan as to its attitude with
regard thereto. If this practice were adopted, an honest taxpayer who
contemplated the organization of one or more corporations in connection
with the conduct of his business could secure a considerable degree of
the assurance which he seeks, by ascertaining in advance whether in the
view of the treasury the new corporate entities would be disregarded
or recognized.
But even if the treasury were to adopt this practice, we would still
be very far from a solution. In the first place, since no adequate cri-
terion has been suggested by which to measure corporate entities, the
56. Patent Royalties Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 65 F. (2d)
580, 582 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933).
57. 251 Fed. 211 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918).
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decisions of the treasury in advance of the adoption of a plan would
necessarily be as arbitrary as they are now when they are made after
its adoption. Again, such advance rulings might have a strong tendency
to discourage commercial activity in many cases, and thus to cause a
loss of revenue to the government; for the treasury might well reject
many plans which tax experts would have approved. On the other
hand, courageous taxpayers, hoping to upset treasury rulings by judicial
review, would often proceed in disregard of treasury advice and adopt
plans which the treasury had held taxable; and in this event there
would be no improvement over present practice. Most serious of all,
it is very likely that the necessity of passing on all plans will be a far
greater strain on the administrative machinery of the treasury than it
can readily bear. These considerations make it plain that the rendition
of treasury rulings in advance of the adoption of plans would be at
best a limited expedient. The essential problem with regard to cor-
porate entity still remains, and we are still confronted with the task of
discovering a basis for judgment in this class of cases. What is needed
is a fundamental principle which can be embodied either in legislation
or in judicial decisions and which will be applicable to the vast majority
of cases which come before the courts and which involve the problem
of determining whether a particular corporation is to be treated as a
separate entity or merely as the extension of an already existing juristic
personality.
Of course, the position which we have found implicit in the opinions
of Judge Learned Hand-to resolve all doubtful cases in favor of the
government-would, in a sense, circumvent this necessity. And whether
or not we have correctly analyzed Judge Hand's opinions, a strong case
has been stated in support of that view. To be sure, if all doubtful
cases resulted in the imposition of the income tax regardless of technical
considerations and without benefit of rigid general rules for dealing
with the problem of corporate entity, the taxpayers would soon learn
the futility of attempting to evolve fine-spun, hair-splitting devices.
Diversity among the decisions would certainly tend to be considerably
lessened in practical result, if not in juristic reasoning. Taxpayers would
no doubt find by repeated experiences that the more involved and com-
plicated the plan, the greater the likelihood of taxation. And while in
the past the rule has been enunciated by the courts that all doubts are
to be resolved in favor of the taxpayer, 8 this in and of itself is no rea-
son why a contrary rule should not be adopted if it can be shown to be
serviceable and to provide a more efficient system of tax collection. Nor
can it be denied that the primary purpose and function of a system of




taxation is not to provide abstract rules and symmetrical principles, but
to provide abundant revenue.
But, despite its practical conveniences and justifications, the sug-
gestion has its dangers and difficulties, its elements of unfairness and
even of uncertainty. It must be remembered that while it is a primary
purpose of the Income Tax Law to collect the needed governmental
revenue, it is and should be an equally important purpose of that law
that the burden of the income tax shall fall equally and fairly upon all
taxpayers in accordance with their earnings over a particular period and
without unnecessary harshness. To assume with Draconian severity
that in all doubtful cases the tax should be imposed is to ignore this
second and equally important purpose of the Income Tax Law. It is
almost equivalent to saying to a taxpayer that he must pay the income
tax not only if he has had the income but even if there is a doubt, a
fair and reasonable doubt, as to whether he has had the income. The
very fact that the case is doubtful means that it is possible that the
taxpayer should have been exempted from the tax, and the uniform
imposition of the tax in every one of those cases would be grossly unfair.
If the governmental revenue from the income tax is not sufficient, more
direct equitable and scientific ways can surely be found for increasing
it, without resorting to what must at best be looked upon by the tax-
payers as a subterfuge in governmental administration of the tax law.
Moreover, the suggestion that the Government tax all doubtful cases
raises another and equally difficult question. What is a doubtful case?
That in itself may become the subject of great debate and uncertainty.
The scientists tell us that the universe is finite. It may be larger or
smaller than our measurements presently indicate, but it has an end.
Tax situations do not, however, end so completely; and borderline cases
cannot be eliminated by extending the borderline beyond its present
position. Very frequently what is too clear for argument to one jurist
is a 'matter of grave doubt to another and often provides the very issue
-upon which courts divide. 0
Another possibility would be the adoption of the test enunciated by
:the Board of Tax Appeals in George H. Chisholm," namely, that recog-
nition as a separate legal entity for taxation purposes should be ac-
corded only to those business units organized in the course of normal
business or made necessary by ordinary business convenience. Should
it turn out that it is possible to apply such a rule it would certainly
59. The rule that a statute which is clear in its terms precludes resort to extrinsic
evidence of its intent affords some analogy, as Mr. Justice McKenna remarked In his
dissent in the Caminetti case, 242 U. S. 470, 496 (1917): "The principle has attractive
and seemingly disposing simplicity, but that it is not easy of application or, at least,
encounters other principles, many cases demonstrate."
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seem to contain all the elements of fairness of which we have already
spoken. It seems to divide all corporations into two mutually exclusive
classes, the normal and convenient, and the unusual and unnecessary. It
is possible that the situation we are discussing is of such a nature that
only a norm of this kind can be evolved. But it is difficult to rid oneself
of the feeling that the suggested solution is too vague and uncertain
to be useful. Business convenience and business custom are extremely
nebulous concepts. What may appear as normal and convenient to one
group of business men will appear entirely the other way to another
group. The determination must be based upon a judgment to be made
in the light of certain facts. Frequently the success or failure of a
particular enterprise depends upon the soundness of this very judgment.
If all men were like-minded, this solution would indeed be one of the
simplest. But conditions being what they are, it is difficult to imagine
business men agreeing even generally on questions of this character,
and it is even more difficult to imagine the courts and the taxing officials
having harmonious views with regard to business convenience. Nor,
in view of the infinite variety of particular business situations, as well
as the variety of business judgments, is it practical to look for a mythical
"normal" course of conduct. In the end, every case would depend for
its solution on the arbitrary judgment of the courts as to whether a
particular course of conduct was normal and convenient under all the
circumstances. Such judgment could only be made by appeals to the
commercial experience of a particular judge or set of judges and would
lead us directly to a sort of judicial solipsism, to the importation of the
"inarticulate major premise" into income tax cases. A formal consis-
tency might be attained in the decisions, but it would mask a state
of the law as unpredictable and confused as that which obtains at present.
Inadequate as the foregoing test must be considered, nevertheless the
case which enunciated it contained language and embodied a point
of view which suggest a considerably more promising approach. The
specific test adopted was an objective one, yet the Board of Tax Appeals
was obviously attempting to formulate a standard which would take
the taxpayer's motive into account. In this direction, it would seem,
lies a possible solution of at least part of this vexing problem. The
courts might adopt the rule that all corporations which are formed or
are being used chiefly for the purpose of avoiding taxation should not
be regarded as separate entities and that only those corporations be
considered as separate personalities which were formed or were used
for purposes other than the avoidance of taxation. It is of course per-
fectly clear that the problem of determining the dominant purpose of
the formation or use of a corporation is not always an easy one, that
it requires careful investigation and a detailed knowledge of all the facts
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and circumstances surrounding a particular case. Yet experience has
taught us that it is comparatively simple to conduct the necessary
investigation and to find the motive of the taxpayer writ large in the
plans he has adopted and in the manner of their execution. To dis-
cover the dominant purpose for the formation of a corporation is to
make a determination with regard to a fairly precise fact. On the other
hand, to investigate whether a corporation was formed in the ordinary
course of convenient business practice is to delve into the realms of
conjecture, to attempt to apply vague and elastic criteria of judgment
to varying states of fact. The former is infrequently controvertible.
The latter is nearly always the subject of discussion and debate and
a matter about which satisfactory conclusions can seldom be definitely
formed.
We are aware of the great difficulties that are involved in this sug-
gestion. It necessitates a radical departure not only from existing
judicial precedents, but from the existing spirit of income tax legisla-
tion itself. We have seen that the courts have refused to say that the
formation of a corporation for the sole purpose of avoiding income tax
is ground for disregarding its corporate personality.30 In the same way,
the Income Tax Law itself has recognized the right to create corpora-
tions for the purpose of avoiding income tax levies. Thus the law per-
mits an individual to transfer his property to a corporation of which
he becomes the owner of all the stock without incurring any tax liability
therefor.60 In this way, many taxpayers are able to escape the imposi-
tion of very heavy surtaxes. Legislative permission for the filing of
consolidated reports by two or more corporations is another illustra-
tion-this time of the legal sanction for disregarding corporate entities,
to avoid income tax.' Yet despite these judicial obstacles, and legis-
lative exceptions, it seems to us that this test of dominant purpose is the
closest' approximation to a working rule that has thus far been sug-
gested. It would involve a reversal of the existing judicial attitude,
but at the same time it would give to the treasury a fixed principle with
which to operate in cases involving corporate personality. The de-
termination of motive, moreover, is a question of fact; and if not entirely
devoid of supporting evidence, the administrative ruling would not be
subject to judicial review. To be sure, it is not plain that a solution
can thus easily be arrived at in every case. There will always remain
doubtful cases where the closest scrutiny and the fullest familiarity with
facts will not be able to reveal the true purposes of the taxpayer's plan,
and there is always a certain latitude of doubt where motives of various
kinds coexist; but in practice these difficulties are not so formidable.
60. See Income Tax Act of 1932, Sec. 112 (5), 47 STAT. 196, 26 U. S. C. A. § 3112
(1932).
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There are few secrets between the treasury and the taxpayer, and the
dominant purposes of the latter in all plans that he adopts do not long
remain a mystery to administrative officials. In a word, it seems pos-
sible that the quantity of uncertainty under this criterion may prove
to be smaller than under the other proposals.
That law contains a large amount of uncertainty has long been
recognized by commentators. It derives in the various branches of
legal science from different sources. In constitutional law, our studies
of due process have led to the conclusion that the personality of the
judges is often the variable factor.0 ' In tort cases, the inherent diffi-
culty of applying a standard of judgment to constantly changing factual
situations gives rise to the difficulty. 2 In the cases we have referred
to in this article, our inability to formulate a serviceable rule or a
guiding principle, is the basis of the evil. In the end, the administration
of justice in all of these cases becomes an individual matter, and the
efficiency of our system can be tested only by analyzing the results of
a particular rule over a given period. We must always bear in mind
that the efficient collection of taxes dictates the promulgation of rules
easily applicable to varieties of situations and at least a rough pragmatic
logic, easily comprehensible by lawyers and laymen alike.a
61. Powell, The Judidaity of Minimum-Wage Legislation (1924) 37 HAnv. L. Rlv.
545, 546. 'Until some due-process issue is authoritatively settled, one who would mahe
a constitutional prophecy or a constitutional argument should be familiar with the outlool
and the temper of the judges by whom the issue is to be decided."
62. Pound, The Administrative Application of Legal Standards (1919) 44 A. B. A.
RE'. 445, 458-459.
63. After this article went to press, the Supreme Court of the United States decided the
case of Gregory v. Helvering, (1935) 2 U. S. L. Week 29, Col. 2, in which the Court rec-
ognized the rule that the motive of the taxpayer in forming a corporation is not to b2
considered in determining income tax liability. In that case it was held that the corpara-
tion must be formed for a corporate or business purpose in order to be considered as a
party to a reorg-anization: "When subdivision (B) speaks of a transfer of assets by one
corporation to another, it means a transfer made 'in pursuance of a plan of reorganization'
(Sec. 112 (g)) of corporate business; and not a transfer of assets by one corporation to
another in pursuance of a plan having no relation to the business of either, as plainly is
the case here. Putting aside, then, the question of motive in respect of taxation altogether,
and fxing the character of the proceeding by what actually occurred, what do we find?
Simply an operation having no business or corporate purpose--a mere device which put
on the form of a corporate reorganization as a disguise for concealing its real character,
and the sole object and accomplishment of which was the consummation of a preconceived
plan, not to reorganize a business or any part of a business, but to transfer a parcel of
corporate shares to the petitioner."
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